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63 
THE PRE-HISTORY OF SUBSIDIARITY IN 
LEO XIII 
MICHAEL P. MORELAND† 
Christian Legal Thought is a much-anticipated contribution 
from Patrick Brennan and William Brewbaker that brings the 
resources of the Christian intellectual tradition to bear on law 
and legal education.  Among its many strengths, the book deftly 
combines Catholic and Protestant contributions and scholarly 
material with more widely accessible sources such as sermons 
and newspaper columns.  But no project aiming at a crisp and 
manageably-sized presentation of Christianity’s contribution to 
law could hope to offer a comprehensive treatment of particular 
themes.  And so, in this brief essay, I seek to elaborate upon the 
treatment of the principle of subsidiarity in Catholic social 
thought. 
Subsidiarity is mentioned a handful of times in Christian 
Legal Thought, most squarely with a lengthy quotation from Pius 
XI’s articulation of the principle in Quadragesimo Anno.1  In this 
proposed elaboration of subsidiarity, I wish to broaden the 
discussion of subsidiarity historically (back a few decades from 
Quadragesimo Anno to the pontificate of Leo XIII) and 
philosophically (most especially its relation to Leo XIII’s revival 
of Thomism).2 
Statements of the principle have historically been terse and 
straightforward even if the application of subsidiarity to 
particular legal questions has not.  For example, the 
Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, released in 
2004 by the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, devotes only 
 
† University Professor of Law and Religion, Villanova University. 
1 POPE PIUS XI, QUADRAGESIMO ANNO, (1931) reprinted in CHRISTIAN LEGAL 
THOUGHT: MATERIALS AND CASES 479–80 (2017). 
2 Parts of this essay draw upon Michael P. Moreland, Subsidiarity and the 
Safeguards of Federalism (2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boston College) 
(on file with author). 
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two pages to the principle of subsidiarity.3  The historical origins 
of subsidiarity are rooted in the Church’s opposition to 
totalitarianism and various forms of collectivism4 and a 
concomitant affirmation of human dignity.5 
It is helpful to consider certain pitfalls posed by the current 
debate over subsidiarity.  One obstacle in arriving at a precise 
understanding of subsidiarity is the tendency to view the 
principle as one of limited government alone.6  As summarized by 
Robert Sirico of the libertarian Acton Institute, this view holds 
that: 
The clear meaning of the subsidiarity principle is to limit the 
powers and responsibilities assumed by the higher orders of 
society.  In nearly every occasion in which the principle has 
been invoked in the last one hundred years of official Catholic 
social teaching, it is in the context of limiting the uses of power.7 
The U.S. Catholic bishops’ 1986 letter on the economy, Economic 
Justice for All, expresses a similar view in some paragraphs of 
the document: “This principle [of subsidiarity] states that, in 
order to protect basic justice, government should undertake only 
those initiatives which exceed the capacity of individuals or 
private groups acting independently.  Government should not 
replace or destroy smaller communities and individual 
initiative.”8 
While this “liberal” interpretation of subsidiarity is an 
important and enduring expression of the principle in the 
literature, other sources suggest a less “libertarian” aspect to 
 
3 COMPENDIUM OF THE SOCIAL DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH ¶¶ 185–88, at 81–82 
(2004). The Catechism of the Catholic Church states the principle as “a community 
of a higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a community of a lower 
order, depriving the latter of its functions . . . .” CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC 
CHURCH ¶ 1883 (2d ed. 1997). 
4 Louis Dupré, The Common Good and the Open Society, in CATHOLICISM AND 
LIBERALISM: CONTRIBUTIONS TO AMERICAN PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 172, 191 (R. Bruce 
Douglass & David Hollenbach, S.J. eds., 1994). 
5 Joseph A. Komonchak, Subsidiarity in the Church: The State of the Question, 
48 JURIST 298, 301–02 (1988). 
6 See Christopher Wolfe, Subsidiarity: The “Other” Ground of Limited 
Government, in CATHOLICISM, LIBERALISM, AND COMMUNITARIANISM: THE 
CATHOLIC INTELLECTUAL TRADITION AND THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF DEMOCRACY, 
81 (Kenneth L. Grasso, Gerard V. Bradley, & Robert P. Hunt eds., 1995). 
7 Robert A. Sirico, Subsidiarity, Society, and Entitlements: Understanding and 
Application, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 549, 557 (1997). 
8 UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Economic Justice for All: 
Pastoral Letter on Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy ¶ 124 (1986). 
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subsidiarity.9 In the words of Quadragesimo Anno, “every social 
activity ought of its nature to furnish help to the members of the 
body social, and never destroy and absorb them.”10  Joseph 
Komonchak notes that subsidiarity has both negative 
(libertarian) and positive (communitarian) aspects: 
The principle of subsidiarity requires positively that all 
communities not only permit but enable and encourage 
individuals to exercise their own self-responsibility and that 
larger communities do the same for smaller ones . . . .  It 
requires negatively that communities not deprive individuals 
and smaller communities of their right to exercise their self-
responsibility.  Intervention, in other words, is only appropriate 
as “helping people help themselves.”11 
Part of the confusion over subsidiarity—but also, perhaps, an 
aspect of the principle’s richness—is its combination, then, of 
both “libertarian” and “communitarian” elements.  Progress in 
our understanding and application of subsidiarity will require a 
careful assessment of these considerations and determining when 
intervention or assistance [subsidium] from a higher authority is 
needed and when devolution of responsibility is warranted.  More 
precisely, we will need to determine when authority is properly 
located at a higher level and when authority is properly 
 
9 I use the terms “liberal” and “libertarian” here cautiously, for there are 
important differences in the conception of personhood underlying classical 
liberalism—with its emphasis on individual autonomy—and subsidiarity. See Jean 
Bethke Elshtain, Catholic Social Thought and Liberal America, in CATHOLICISM 
AND LIBERALISM, supra note 4, at 151, 159–62 (describing Catholic social thought in 
general and subsidiarity in particular as “begin[ning] from a fundamentally different 
ontology from that assumed and required by individualism, on the one hand, and 
statist collectivism, on the other” and “refus[ing] stark alternatives between 
individualism and collectivism”). The terms “libertarian” and “communitarian” in 
the discussion to follow, then, are used in a broad sense (not, except by analogy, as 
designating a particular political philosophical position) and merely denote different 
aspects of subsidiarity as a principle favoring limited government but also 
government intervention where appropriate. 
10 POPE PIUS XI, QUADRAGESIMO ANNO ¶ 79 (1931). 
11 Komonchak, supra note 5, at 302 (emphasis in original); see also Dupré, supra 
note 4, at 191: 
The principle of subsidiarity . . . prevents the common good from assuming 
an existence independent of private concerns, and thus turning into social 
ideology. Only a social system based on subsidiarity can avoid turning the 
state into either a mere legal sanction of individual interests (as in 
nineteenth-century liberalism) or into a personification of a common good 
in which individual interests are not adequately represented (as in the 
dictatorial states of the twentieth century). 
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recognized in the smaller community.  This conclusion, in turn, 
will require a discussion of subsidiarity’s political theoretical and 
“anthropological” dimensions, that is, its grounding in a 
conception of the person in society.  Rather than as a principle 
only of economic efficiency or limited government, subsidiarity is 
best viewed as an aspect of Catholic social thought’s emphasis on 
the human person adequately understood.12  Subsidiarity, I aim 
to show, cannot be properly understood apart from an adequate 
appreciation of the Catholic theory of political authority, of the 
state, and of associational life. 
I. LEO XIII 
Elected pope in 1878 at the age of sixty-seven, Leo XIII is 
widely acknowledged to be the progenitor of modern Catholic 
social teaching, even if a significant body of such social teaching 
preceded his pontificate.13  Though he issued at least twelve 
documents that could be considered to comprise his social 
teaching,14 Leo’s 1891 encyclical Rerum Novarum is the most 
complete and enduring expression of his social theory.  Rerum 
Novarum contains lengthy sections on topics that will recur in 
papal social encyclicals for the next century and that bear on 
subsidiarity, such as private property, the Church’s hostility 
toward liberalism and socialism, the rights of workers, and the 
role of the Church in the social order.  It is, however, Leo’s 
 
12 See Thomas C. Kohler, Lessons from the Social Charter: State, Corporation, 
and the Meaning of Subsidiarity, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 607, 615 (1993) (“The principle 
[of subsidiarity] insists that the state and all other forms of community exist for the 
individual.”). 
13 For treatments of the pre-Leonine social tradition, see PAUL MISNER, SOCIAL 
CATHOLICISM IN EUROPE: FROM THE ONSET OF INDUSTRIALIZATION TO THE FIRST 
WORLD WAR, 149–52 (1991), and MICHAEL J. SCHUCK, THAT THEY BE ONE: THE 
SOCIAL TEACHINGS OF THE PAPAL ENCYCLICALS 1740-1989, at 31–33 (1991). 
14 In his collection Social Wellsprings, Joseph Husslein, S.J., includes 
Inscrutabili (Evils of Society), Quod Apostolici Muneris (The Socialists), Arcanum 
(Christian Marriage), Diuturnum (Civil Government), Immortale Dei (Christian 
Constitution of States), In Plurimis (Abolition of African Slavery), Libertas Humana 
(Human Liberty), Sapientiae Christianae (Chief Duties of Christian Citizens), 
Laetitiae Sanctae (Rosary and Social Question), Annum Sacrum (Consecration of 
Mankind to the Sacred Heart), and Graves de Communi (Christian Popular Action) 
in addition to Rerum Novarum. JOSEPH HUSSLEIN, S.J., SOCIAL WELLSPRINGS: 
FOURTEEN EPOCHAL DOCUMENTS BY POPE LEO XIII (Bruce Publishing Company 
1940). For a discussion of Husslein’s own important role in transmitting the papal 
social encyclicals to the American Catholic Church, see Stephen A. Werner, Joseph 
Husslein, S.J., and the American Catholic Literary Revival: “A University in Print,” 
87 CATH. HIST. REV. 688, 696–97 (2001). 
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nascent expression of the principle of subsidiarity throughout 
Rerum Novarum that we will explore here.  As noted by John 
Courtney Murray, further elaboration of the principle of 
subsidiarity and related concepts “are substantially in the line 
set by Leo XIII when he defined the relation of government to the 
social and economic order.”15 
Leo ushered in the era of the “Leonine synthesis” in Catholic 
social doctrine, which “reached its creative high-water mark in 
the 1930s between the two world wars, but its effects were 
consolidated at the Second Vatican Council (1962–65).”16  Leo’s 
writing on social matters was broadly influenced by the 
commitment to Thomism advanced in his 1879 encyclical Aeterni 
Patris.17  This allegiance to Thomism was itself the product of a 
contingent philosophical history and the influence of a small 
circle of nineteenth century Jesuit Thomists, a history recounted 
in recent years by Alasdair MacIntyre and Gerald McCool.18  
Indeed, the Italian Jesuit Thomist Luigi Taparelli D’Azeglio is 
arguably the defining influence on the early formulation of what 
would become the principle of subsidiarity and on much else in 
Leo’s reappropriation of Thomism.19 
A. Rerum Novarum 
Rerum Novarum’s theory of what the tradition will later 
term “subsidiarity” is detailed amid the encyclical’s discussion of 
four topics: private property, the family, the role of the state, and 
the significance of associations.  The encyclical begins with a 
 
15 John Courtney Murray, S.J., Leo XIII: Two Concepts of Government, 14 
THEOLOGICAL STUD. 551, 553 (1953). 
16 John Witte Jr. & Frank S. Alexander, THE TEACHINGS OF MODERN 
CHRISTIANITY ON LAW, POLITICS, AND HUMAN NATURE 3, 11 (2007). 
17 See generally POPE LEO XIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER AETERNI PATRIS (1879). 
18 See generally ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL 
ENQUIRY: ENCYCLOPAEDIA, GENEALOGY, AND TRADITION 72–73 (1990); GERALD A. 
MCCOOL, CATHOLIC THEOLOGY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: THE QUEST FOR A 
UNITARY METHOD 2, 17 (1977). 
19 For an overview of the neo-Thomists of the period and their influence on Leo, 
see JOE HOLLAND, MODERN CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING: THE POPES CONFRONT 
THE INDUSTRIAL AGE 1740–1958, at 119 (2003); MCCOOL, supra note 18; Thomas C. 
Behr, Luigi Taparelli and the 19th-Century Neo-Thomistic “Revolution” in Natural 
Law and Catholic Social Sciences (2000) (Ph.D. dissertation, SUNY Buffalo) 
[hereinafter Behr, “Revolution”]; Thomas C. Behr, Luigi Taparelli D’Azeglio, S.J. 
(1793–1862) and the Development of Scholastic Natural-Law Thought as a Science of 
Society and Politics, 6 J. MKTS. & MORALITY, 99 (2001) [hereinafter Behr, 
Development]. 
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famous (and controversial) discussion of private property.  In his 
eagerness to distance the Church from various forms of socialism, 
some argue that Leo implicitly adopted a modern, Lockean 
theory of private property that sits uneasily with the Church’s 
historical teaching on private property.20  Whatever the merits of 
that argument, themes advanced in the paragraphs of Rerum 
Novarum on private property will mark future discussions of 
subsidiarity and do not turn, for the most part, on the theory of 
private property advanced in the letter.  Nonetheless, the early 
paragraphs of Rerum Novarum set the Church’s social teaching 
down on one side or another of several contentious issues in 
modern political theory.  Leo asserts the link between human 
nature and private property at paragraph six,21 but this 
argument is part of a larger argument about human nature and 
the foundations of politics.  Leo, then, stands in the long line of 
Catholic—and particularly Thomist—argument regarding 
natural law and moral knowledge. 
The argument in paragraphs seven through seventeen 
begins with an assertion about the proper relation of the person 
to the state:  “Man precedes the State [respublica], and possesses, 
prior to the formation of any State [civitas], the right of providing 
for the sustenance of his body.”22  This assertion about the person 
and the state leads Leo to conclude, by way of a historical 
argument, that private property is “pre-eminently in conformity 
with human nature.”23  Similarly, the family has “rights and 
duties which are prior to those of the community, and founded 
more immediately in nature.”24  This argument regarding private  
 
 
20 See Ernest L. Fortin, A.A., “Sacred and Inviolable”: Rerum Novarum and 
Natural Rights, 53 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 203, 204 (1992); B. Andrew Lustig, Natural 
Law, Property, and Justice: The General Justification of Property in John Locke, 19 
J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 119, 143–44 (1991); Paul J. Weithman, Natural Law, Property, 
and Redistribution, 21 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 165, 165–67 (1993); B. Andrew Lustig, 
Property, Justice, and the Common Good: A Response to Paul J. Weithman, 21 J. 
RELIGIOUS ETHICS 181, 183–84, 186 (1993). 
21 RERUM NOVARUM, supra note 14, ¶ 6. 
22 Id. ¶ 7. 
23 Id. ¶ 11. 
24 Id. ¶ 13. See also id. ¶ 12, in which Leo writes of “the family, the ‘society’ of a 
man’s house—a society very small, one must admit, but none the less a true society, 
and one older than any State. Consequently, it has rights and duties peculiar to 
itself which are quite independent of the State.” 
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property and the family builds to Leo’s rejection of “the main 
tenet of socialism, community goods” as “directly contrary to the 
natural rights of mankind.”25 
It might be difficult at first glance to see the relevance of this 
discussion of private property, the family, and socialism to 
subsidiarity, but Leo lays the groundwork for such an argument 
with his claim that it is “impossible to reduce civil society to one 
dead level.”26  This argument will, however, turn not toward a 
discussion of levels of civil society and the apportionment of 
responsibility among them—as one would expect were 
subsidiarity the principal subject—but instead to the topic of 
natural differences among human capacities and the inequality 
that results.  The next several paragraphs of the encyclical take 
up the appropriate response to the plight of the poor and the 
responsibility of the state and civil society to alleviate the 
condition of the poor, all while taking care not to frame the 
discussion in terms of class struggle.27 
This aspect of social harmony is on display, for example, in 
paragraph nineteen, where Leo writes that “[j]ust as the 
symmetry of the human frame is the result of the suitable 
arrangement of the different parts of the body, so in a State is it 
ordained by nature that these two classes [the ‘wealthy’ and 
‘working men’] should dwell in harmony and agreement.”28  But 
lest this assertion of irreducible harmony among the classes in 
society lead to neglect of the poor, Leo moves to a set of 
exhortations regarding the church’s charitable work.  “The 
Church . . . intervenes directly in behalf of the poor,” he writes, 
“by setting on foot and maintaining many associations which she 
knows to be efficient for the relief of poverty.”29 
One of the principal questions posed by the contemporary 
debate over subsidiarity—when is intervention by a higher level 
of civil authority in the affairs of a local community warranted?—
is expressly addressed only once in Rerum Novarum, in 
 
25 Id. ¶ 15. 
26 Id. ¶ 17. 
27 Id. ¶¶ 19–30. 
28 Id. ¶ 19. 
29 Id. ¶ 29. The Church’s own charitable work is a theme running throughout 
papal social teaching, even where the tradition is at pains to emphasize the 
responsibility of the state and the wider society. See POPE BENEDICT XVI, DEUS 
CARITAS EST ¶¶ 31–39 (2005). 
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paragraph thirty-six.30  Paragraphs thirty-one and following treat 
the proper role of the state,31 and paragraph thirty-five asserts 
that the state “must not absorb the individual or the family; both 
should be allowed free and untrammelled action so far as is 
consistent with the common good and the interests of others.”32  
Paragraph thirty-six then proceeds to ask when the state must 
intervene.33  The clearest requirement for such intervention, 
according to Leo, is where it is necessary for “peace and good 
order.”34  But Leo goes on to argue that “[t]he limits [of the 
intervention of public authority] must be determined by the 
nature of the occasion which calls for the law’s interference—the 
principle being that the law must not undertake more, nor 
proceed further, than is required for the remedy of the evil or the 
removal of the mischief.”35 
The paragraphs of Rerum Novarum that arguably bear most 
directly on subsidiarity are Leo’s short but suggestive discussion 
of civil society and associations at paragraph fifty-one and 
following: 
These lesser societies and the larger society differ in many 
respects, because their immediate purpose and aim is different.  
Civil society exists for the common good, and hence is concerned 
with the interests of all in general, albeit with individual 
interests also in their due place and degree . . . .  Private 
societies, then, although they exist within the body politic, and 
are severally part of the commonwealth, cannot nevertheless be 
absolutely, and as such, prohibited by public authority.  For, to 
enter into a “society” of this kind is the natural right of man; 
and the State has for its office to protect natural rights, not to 
destroy them; and, if it forbid its citizens to form associations, it 
contradicts the very principle of its own existence, for both they 
and it exist in virtue of the like principle, namely, the natural 
tendency of man to dwell in society.36 
 
30 RERUM NOVARUM, supra note 14, ¶ 36. 
31 Id. ¶¶ 31–38. 
32 Id. ¶ 35. 
33 Id. ¶ 36. 
34 Id. The examples of what constitutes “peace and good order” illustrate that 
Leo has in mind more than mere avoidance of civil war or warding off the Hobbesian 
state, as when he writes “that all things should be carried on in accordance with 
God’s laws and those of nature” and “that the discipline of family life should be 
observed and that religion should be obeyed.” Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. ¶ 51. 
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Leo immediately qualifies this assertion of associational rights 
with the claim that “[t]here are occasions, doubtless, when it is 
fitting that the law should intervene to prevent certain 
associations, as when men join together for purposes which are 
evidently bad, unlawful, or dangerous to the State.”37 
With this spare statement of the limits of state intervention, 
Leo laid the groundwork for the elaboration of subsidiarity in 
later papal documents.  Reconstructing Leo’s discussion of 
subsidiarity in Rerum Novarum, we can identify three main 
themes running through the paragraphs of Rerum Novarum that 
bear on subsidiarity: (1) a rejection of socialism and an inchoate 
preference for the limited state; (2) a defense of private property; 
and (3) an extended treatment of the role of the family.  We can 
already see in this, the first and perhaps most important 
document in the papal social tradition, subsidiarity being 
invoked as an aspect of the Church’s rejection of totalitarianism, 
which, in turn, was originally an argument directed toward 
socialism and its rejection of private property rights.  Following 
the criticism of socialism by way of a defense of private property, 
the encyclical then turns to a treatment of civil society and the 
role of the state.  In summary, Leo’s argument is that (1) 
differences and inequalities are based on differing capacities, 
which gives rise to the condition of the poor; (2) assistance to the 
poor requires the intervention of the state, just as the state 
otherwise intervenes appropriately for peace and good order; and 
(3) associations of workers and, more generally, public and 
private societies are a means of complementing the role of the 
state. 
B. Aeterni Patris and Immortale Dei 
Though Rerum Novarum is, by a considerable margin, the 
document from the reign of Leo with which most are familiar, it 
is important to note the setting of Rerum Novarum among the 
other major encyclicals of Leo’s pontificate.  Two warrant 
particular attention here: Leo’s 1879 encyclical on Christian 
philosophy, Aeterni Patris, and his 1885 letter on the Christian 
constitution of states, Immortale Dei. 
 
 
37 Id. ¶ 52. 
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Reading Rerum Novarum apart from Aeterni Patris, it is 
difficult to appreciate the place of Leo’s (and his successors’) 
social teaching within the Catholic intellectual tradition 
generally and the Thomist tradition more specifically.  Even if it 
is difficult to trace each turn in twentieth century social teaching 
to its Thomist roots, Thomism is both a methodological and 
substantive component of Catholic social teaching, including the 
principle of subsidiarity.38  Methodologically, the Thomism of 
Aeterni Patris supplied a resource for criticism of modern 
rationalism, as argued by Alasdair MacIntyre: 
Aeterni Patris summoned its readers to renewal of an 
understanding of intellectual enquiry as the continuation of a 
specific type of tradition, that which achieved definitive 
expression in the writings of Aquinas, one the appropriation of 
which could not only provide the resources for radical criticism 
of the conception of rationality dominant in nineteenth-century 
modernity . . . but also preserve and justify the canonical status 
of the Bible as distinct from, yet hegemonic over, all secular 
enquiry.39 
Substantively, the legacy of Thomism is apparent in the 
prevalence of natural law theory in Catholic social teaching.  In 
contrast to, for example, the resort to scriptural metaphors often 
encountered in Protestant social ethics (such as the American 
Social Gospel Movement of the early twentieth century), Catholic 
social teaching has frequently relied on philosophical forms of 
argument that do not presuppose the principles of Christian 
revelation. 
The previous discussion of Rerum Novarum may mislead the 
reader into believing that document was an encyclical on church 
and state.  To be clear, Rerum Novarum was not a document on 
church and state in the juridical sense but rather was addressed 
to social (and not merely economic) matters, particularly the 
family and the relationship of capital and labor.  A shorter and 
more explicit statement of Leo’s views on church and state is to 
be found six years before Rerum Novarum in his encyclical  
 
 
38 For a recent attempt to recover the relevance of Aquinas to subsidiarity, see 
Nicholas Aroney, Subsidiarity, Federalism, and the Best Constitution: Thomas 
Aquinas on City, Province and Empire, 26 LAW & PHIL. 161 (2007). 
39 MACINTYRE, supra note 18, at 25. 
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Immortale Dei.  There one finds the initial articulations in 
modern Catholic social thought of a broadly Thomist 
understanding of the state and society: 
Man’s natural instinct moves him to live in civil society, for he 
cannot, if dwelling apart, provide himself with the necessary 
requirements of life, nor procure the means of developing his 
mental and moral faculties. Hence, it is divinely ordained that 
he should lead his life—be it family, or civil—with his fellow 
men, amongst whom alone his several wants can be adequately 
supplied.  But, as no society can hold together unless some one 
be over all, directing all to strive earnestly for the common good, 
every body politic must have a ruling authority, and this 
authority, no less than society itself, has its source in nature, 
and has, consequently, God for its Author.40 
Immortale Dei’s purpose, however, was not to contribute to 
an overall Catholic theory of the state and the relationship 
among social forms, as would be most relevant to a treatment of 
subsidiarity.  Instead, and as noted by John Courtney Murray in 
his seminal articles on Leo’s doctrine of church and state, the 
predominant concern in Immortale Dei and related encyclicals 
was the problem of religious freedom—religious freedom in the 
modern state, the role of conscience with respect to the state, and 
the church’s role in the modern state.41 
II. LUIGI TAPARELLI D’AZEGLIO 
Luigi Taparelli (1793–1862) taught the future Leo XIII at 
the Collegio Romano in the 1820s and was a decisive influence on 
Leonine social doctrine and on Leo’s adoption of Thomism.42  
Appreciation of Taparelli’s significance is hindered in the 
Anglophone world by the lack of any English translations of his 
work and only passing attention to Taparelli in the work of 
historians of nineteenth century theology such as Gerald McCool.  
 
40 Pope Leo XIII, IMMORTALE DEI ¶ 3 (1885). 
41 John Courtney Murray, S.J., Leo XIII on Church and State: The General 
Structure of the Controversy, 14 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 1 (1953); John Courtney 
Murray, S.J., Leo XIII: Separation of Church and State, 14 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 145 
(1953); Murray, supra note 15, at 551; John Courtney Murray, S.J., Leo XIII: Two 
Concepts of Government: II. Government and the Order of Culture, 15 THEOLOGICAL 
STUD. 1 (1954). 
42 In much of the following discussion, I am indebted to Thomas C. Behr’s Luigi 
Taparelli and the Nineteenth-Century Neo-Scholastic ‘Revolution’ in Natural Law 
and Catholic Social Sciences. See generally Behr, “Revolution,” supra note 19. 
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In Heinrich Rommen’s minor classic The State in Catholic 
Thought, for example, Taparelli is mentioned only three times, 
two of which are citations to his opposition to universal 
suffrage.43  From the important recent dissertation and 
subsequent writings of historian Thomas Behr, however, we can 
begin to understand the influence of Taparelli on the initial 
stages of modern Catholic social teaching. 
Taparelli was an important part of the nineteenth century 
Thomist revival that culminated in Aeterni Patris.  He was also a 
regular contributor to the Jesuit periodical Civiltà Cattolica for 
several years and is credited with developing the concept of 
“social justice.”44  Taparelli’s most significant work was 
Theoretical Treatise on Natural Right Based on Fact [Saggio 
teoretico di diritto naturale appoggiato sul fatto], which he 
compiled in response to the lack of any textbook on natural law 
that was free, in his view, from misleading doctrines.45  As 
summarized by Thomas Behr, “His thoroughly Thomistic 
intention was to merge a deductive, theoretical approach with an 
inductive historico-sociological approach in a dialectical method 
that would form the basis of a modern science of society and 
politics.”46 
Taparelli’s most important contribution to Catholic social 
doctrine was his development of the basic framework for later 
discussions of the principle of subsidiarity.  As Behr argues, 
Taparelli used a series of metaphors derived from grammar to 
illustrate the concept of “Hypotactic Right,” “[t]he natural and 
just relationships between the myriad of associations that human 
beings tend to form, ranging from the family to the State and 
 
43 HEINRICH A. ROMMEN, THE STATE IN CATHOLIC THOUGHT 110, 437, 458 
(1945). In his book Social Catholicism in Europe: From the Onset of Industrialization 
to the First World War, Paul Misner covers Taparelli’s contribution to Leonine social 
doctrine in two pages, though Misner calls attention to the influence of Taparelli and 
to the Jesuit periodical Civiltà Cattolica with which Taparelli was closely associated. 
See MISNER, supra note 13. 
44 See Behr, Development, supra note 19, at 99; see also Walter T. Odell, The 
Political Theory of Civiltà Cattolica from 1850 to 1870 (1969) (Ph.D. dissertation, 
Georgetown University). 
45 See Behr, Development, supra note 18, at 101. Pius XI cites and commends 
Saggio teoretico di diritto naturale in a footnote to his encyclical Divini Illius 
Magistri as “a work never sufficiently praised and recommended to university 
students.” POPE PIUS XI, DIVINI ILLIUS MAGISTRI ¶ 50 n.33 (1929). 
46 Behr, Development, supra note 19, at 102–03. 
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beyond.”47  Behr explains that Taparelli borrowed the term 
“hypotactic” from the rules of Greek grammar governing “the 
modalities of coordination between clauses, specifically, the 
arrangement of inferior clauses within the functioning of the 
whole sentence.”48  “Hypotactic Right” [dritto ipotattico], then, 
“convey[s] the rights of social groupings, within their just 
relationships, organized toward the common good.”49  Behr 
concludes: 
The principles [Taparelli] elaborates in this regard have found 
their place, though indirectly and imperfectly, in Catholic social 
doctrine, known as the “principle of subsidiarity,” first explicitly 
used by Pius XI in the social encyclical, Quadragesimo Anno.  
Indeed, the Greek hypo taxis can be rendered directly into Latin 
as sub sedeo.  The Latin expression subsidia applied, then, not 
just to mean “help” but in the first instance to auxiliary troops 
within the Roman legion, as they “sat below” ready in reserve to 
support the battle.  The “help” in this context is from the bottom 
up, not from the top down, as the inferior and mediating groups 
all participate in achieving the common good of the more perfect 
association.  While Taparelli uses the legion as an analogy for 
society in various contexts, the rights and obligations derived 
from the laws of subsidiarity vary according to a host of 
historical considerations and competing rights and obligations.50 
As the principle of subsidiarity came to be expressed in the 
social thought of Pius XI and later popes, we will see that some of 
the original inspiration for the principle in Taparelli’s and Leo’s 
Thomism came to be forgotten or neglected.  For example, 
Taparelli’s articulation of Hypotactic Right is clearly not a 
principle of devolution, as the principle of subsidiarity is so often 
understood in later Catholic social teaching.  Rather, the 
principle of subsidiarity is, at least as originally articulated in 
the nineteenth century Thomists, a principle of right social 
ordering toward the common good.  The variation among the 
“rights and obligations derived from the laws of subsidiarity” 
does, however, indeed depend on contingent historical 
circumstances when we would seek to employ subsidiarity in 
navigating particular policy questions. 
 
47 Id. at 104. 
48 Id. at 105. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
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The papal social tradition broadly and the teaching on the 
principle of subsidiarity specifically have, of course, developed 
significantly since Rerum Novarum.  In the pertinent sections 
anticipating subsidiarity in Rerum Novarum, Leo worked within 
the scholastic framework to advance a social theory that began 
with the family and private property and then built up to the 
initial formulation of a doctrine of the state.  As formulated by 
Johannes Messner, the principle of subsidiarity “obliges the state 
authority to take heed of the common good, preferably by means 
of subordinate authorities, namely, those of member societies in 
an organization of the state community based on the federative 
and corporative principles.”51 
 
 
 
51 JOHANNES MESSNER, SOCIAL ETHICS: NATURAL LAW IN THE WESTERN WORLD 
214 (J.J. Doherty trans., 1949). Messner goes on to note that this relation between 
subsidiarity and the common good has important implications for the theory of the 
state: 
The principle of subsidiarity function, however, certainly does not signify a 
weak state standing without authority face to face with a pluralistic 
society. On the contrary, the more strongly the character of society develops 
in its federative and corporative branches, both regional and occupational, 
in conjunction with a plurality of free associations based on economic group 
interests, the more clearly does the common good principle call for a state 
with strong authority which will enable it, in a pluralistic society with 
diversified competencies and interests, to carry out its essential functions: 
namely, to care for the common good and the general interest. 
